We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream …rms. Legal unbundling means that a downstream …rm owns the upstream …rm, but this upstream …rm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream pro…ts. We allow for non-tari¤ discrimination by the upstream …rm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling yields (weakly) higher quantities in the downstream market than vertical separation and integration. Therefore, typically, consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable.
Introduction
In many industries vertically integrated …rms are not only active in the …nal product market, but they also supply essential inputs to potential downstream competitors. Prominent examples are network industries, like energy, rail, or telecommunications where access to a transmission or a railway network is an essential input. Another example is the software industry where, e.g., Microsoft o¤ers "compatibility" to Windows and at the same time competes in the applications market. An important and heavily researched policy question is: should vertical integration be allowed? Standard arguments in favor of integration are that integration at least partially overcomes the double marginalization problem and that it might provide better investment incentives for the upstream operations. The main motivation to vertically separate an integrated …rm is that integration can lead to discriminatory behavior against downstream competitors.
We analyze a third alternative: legal unbundling. Legal unbundling means that the essential input must be controlled by a legally independent entity with an autonomous management, but a …rm that is active in the downstream market is still allowed to own this entity. Ownership under legal unbundling entitles the downstream …rm to receive the entity's pro…ts, but interferences in the entity's operations are forbidden.
Forms of legal unbundling are commonly observed in network industries. Legal unbundling is the current standard requirement for the energy industry in Europe, and the related concept of "Independent System Operators" is also an option in the proposals for a new EU regulation. 3 In the US, forms of legal unbundling exist for natural gas pipelines and in large parts of the electricity transmission systems that are operated by Regional Transmission Organizations or Independent System Operators. 4 Similar forms of "partial separation"are also common in the telecommunications industry in Europe and the US. the marginal cost, e.g., in order to allow for the coverage of …xed costs. While non-discrimination with respect to the access tari¤ is relatively easy to impose, 6 non-tari¤ discrimination remains an important problem in practice. Regulators and competitors report of such "sabotage" in form of discriminatory information ‡ows, undue delays in delivery of the service, overly complex contractual requirements, requiring unreasonably high bank guarantees and the like. 7 Our research question therefore is: How does legal unbundling compare to the outcomes of vertical integration and vertical separation if access prices are regulated while non-tari¤ discrimination cannot be prevented?
To answer this, we propose a fairly general setup. There is one upstream monopolist (F 0 ), a potentially integrated a¢ liated downstream …rm (F 1 ), the "incumbent", and n 1 potential downstream competitors. The upstream …rm produces an essential input at constant marginal cost c 0 , which the downstream …rms need in a …xed proportion to produce the …nal output. We impose no other restriction on the downstream …rms'technologies, in particular, some or all competitors might be more or less e¢ cient than the incumbent F 1 : In the downstream market, the incumbent moves …rst; no other restrictions are imposed on the downstream competition. Strategies could, for example, a¤ect quantities, (non-linear) prices, investments or entry decisions. That the incumbent moves …rst is mainly a simplifying assumption; we exemplify with Cournot competition that the main results also apply with simultaneous moves in the downstream market.
The upstream …rm F 0 sells the input to all downstream …rms at a regulated linear access price a above marginal costs (we also extend this setup to more general forms of price regulation). Although price discrimination is not possible, 6 Although this also can be an issue, e.g., if non-linear tari¤s are used. They might be tailored such that only the subsidiary of the integrated company can realize low prices. Exactly for this reason, regulators are skeptical about such tari¤s. See, e.g., European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry, Competition report on energy sector inquiry (Jan. 10, 2007) , part 1, para 155, p. 58. One example was the access to the Deutsche Telekom network required to o¤er narrowband internet access (a product called T-Online-Connect-Interconnect), where Deutsche Telekom o¤ered quantity rebates which were only realized by its own subsidiary "T-Online". The regulatory authority ruled this to be discriminatory. See the German regulator's annual report "Tätigkeitsbericht 1998/99", p. 67. 7 See, e.g., European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry (Jan. Four di¤erent vertical structures are compared: integration of F 0 and F 1 ; separation (i.e., all …rms are independent); legal unbundling (F 0 is legally independent and maximizes its own pro…ts but is owned by F 1 ); additionally, we discuss also "reverse unbundling" where the downstream …rm is legally unbundled -although this seems to be of less relevance in practice.
Our main result is that legal unbundling leads to (weakly) higher levels of output than all the other vertical structures. In many cases, higher output will translate into (weakly) higher consumer surplus under legal unbundling. The intuition why legal unbundling leads to higher quantities than vertical integration is as follows.
Due to the access price regulation, upstream pro…ts of F 0 are maximized when total output is maximal. Thus, if F 0 is legally unbundled, it wants to maximize total output and refrains from sabotage of the downstream …rms. In contrast, with vertical integration, F 0 also takes into account downstream pro…ts of F 1 and may engage in sabotage of downstream competitors in order to increase downstream pro…ts. We call this the "sabotage e¤ect".
When comparing legal unbundling to vertical separation, more complex forces are at work. First, since in both cases the upstream …rm wants to maximize total output, neither under legal unbundling nor under vertical separation will the upstream (usually) sabotage downstream …rms, i.e., there is essentially no sabotage e¤ect.
Second, while a vertically separated downstream …rm F 1 is interested only in its own pro…ts, under legal unbundling F 1 also has an interest in high upstream pro…ts -and thereby in a high overall output. Under legal unbundling, the downstream …rm F 1 will therefore select strategies that yield higher total output compared to separation. We call this the "downstream expansion e¤ect".
Part of the downstream expansion e¤ect is explained by the well-known intuition from the double marginalization problem: Under legal unbundling the incumbent calculates with the true input costs c 0 and not -as under separation -with the higher access price a and is therefore willing to expand output. In addition, the incumbent takes into account that he can induce an output change by downstream competitors. We call this the "induced output e¤ect". For instance, in the case of legal unbundling and price competition, the incumbent sets a lower price than under separation, in order to increase the output of entrants, who respond to the more aggressive pricing by lowering their own prices. That the induced output e¤ect is indeed additional to the e¤ect from double marginalization becomes apparent when one considers more sophisticated regulatory schemes that solve the double marginalization problem. Even under those schemes, the induced output e¤ect can lead to output expansion under legal unbundling, as discussed in Section 5.1.
Since one of the main policy concerns is about e¢ cient network investments, we extend our analysis to di¤erent forms of investment decisions. Given our quantity results, it is quite intuitive that incentives for reducing the upstream …rm's marginal costs are highest under legal unbundling. We also discuss capacity investments, which can discriminate between downstream …rms, and incentives to invest in network reliability. For these two types of investments it is not generally clear that legal unbundling provides the highest investment incentives, although legal unbundling exhibits some desirable properties also for these sorts of investment decisions.
Despite its great policy relevance in the European Union, there is little literature on legal unbundling. One important exception is Cremer, Crémer, and De Donder (2006) . They conceptually introduced the idea to model legal unbundling in the form that the unbundled …rm independently maximizes its own pro…ts while being a fully-owned subsidiary. Their approach di¤ers from ours since they assume that the downstream …rm is legally unbundled (this is our case of "reverse"unbundling).
We focus on the situation where the upstream …rm is legally unbundled, which seems to be closer to legal practice where the network operations have to be legally independent. Further di¤erences are that they focus on relation-speci…c investments but do not consider sabotage; furthermore, in their setup access prices are not set by the regulator, and downstream …rms always act as price takers.
In a companion paper, Hö-er and Kranz (2007), we analyze the e¤ects of imperfections in legal unbundling. This provides a robustness check for our results and is brie ‡y reviewed in Section 6.
Apart from this, our paper is related to di¤erent strands of literature, namely, in general, to the literature on vertical integration, where an overview is provided, e.g., in Perry (1989) . Vickers (1995) is also related, who compares vertical integration with separation under access price regulation and …nds mixed welfare results.
More recent papers compare investment incentives under vertical integration and separation, like Buehler, Schmutzler, and Benz (2004) , who …nd that generally incentives for quality investments are higher under vertical integration.
Our paper is also related to a literature that focuses on the issue of sabo-tage; see, e.g., Economides (1998) , Beard, Kaserman, and Mayo (2001) or, for an overview, Mandy (2000) . Most recently, Mandy and Sappington (2007) Studying legal unbundling also o¤ers interesting insights into the role of ownership in the theory of the …rm. The de…ning characteristic of ownership can be the right for residual cash- ‡ows (i.e. pro…ts) as in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) or, alternatively, a residual right of control as in Grossman and Hart (1986) . Whereas under vertical integration both rights are granted to the incumbent, under legal unbundling ownership entitles to claim residual cash- ‡ows, but grants no (or very limited) residual rights of control.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, where we assume a regulated linear access price, and where we derive the basic results. Section 3 examines the di¤erent types of upstream investments.
Several results are illustrated for the case of price competition with homogenous goods in Section 4, which also includes a complete welfare analysis for this example. In Section 5, we present a general class of regulatory pricing schemes (including two-part tari¤s for downstream …rms), for which our results hold. Section 6 discusses the results, policy implications, and the e¤ects of imperfect legal unbundling. Section 7 concludes. Unless otherwise stated, all proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Basic model and results
Assumptions and main results
Structure and Regulation There is a monopolistic upstream …rm F 0 that produces a good at constant marginal costs c 0 ; which is used as input good for n competing downstream …rms, F 1 ; :::; F n : Each downstream …rm needs a constant and identical amount of the input good to create an output good. For simplicity,
we normalize input quantities such that each …rm needs exactly one unit of the input good to create one unit of an output good. We are focusing on subgame perfect equilibria in each of the di¤erent games.
Non-tari¤ Discrimination
Downstream Market and Payo¤s Downstream actions, together with sabotage, determine downstream …rm i's output q i (x; h), its market price p i (x; h) and total costs C i (x; hja). Total output quantity is given by Q(h; x) = P n i=1 q i (x; h).
The constant K represents …xed costs and the constant S possible state subsidies.
Note that these upstream pro…ts 0 are strictly increasing in total output Q:
Pro…ts of downstream …rm i are given by
hja) for i = 1; :::; n
Besides a regularity condition that subgame-perfect equilibria exist in every continuation game (Condition C1 below), we make no restrictions on functional forms. The entering downstream …rms i = 2; :::; n maximize their own pro…ts i under all vertical structures.
Vertical structures
Legal unbundling requires that the network part, or more generally, the part of the company controlling the essential facility, has to be separated into a legally independent entity. The EU legislation explicitly states, however, that legal unbundling does not imply that the integrated …rm has to sell the network operations.
Thus, 100% ownership of the network operations F 0 by the incumbent F 1 is current practice under legal unbundling in many European countries (e.g. in the energy industries in France and Germany).
Legal unbundling in our model is perfect in the sense that we assume that regulators are able to incentivize the management of F 0 such that it maximizes only upstream pro…ts 0 without considering the incumbent's downstream pro…ts Access prices When we compare the di¤erent vertical structures, we consider a given access price a that is the same in every vertical structure. We will perform this comparison for every possible access price a > c 0 : As we will discuss below, our results are more general than if we had compared only the optimum access price for each vertical structure.
Regularity conditions Since we compare di¤erent vertical structures, we essentially compare outcomes of di¤erent games. Note, however, that -although payo¤s of F 0 and F 1 di¤er -the timing, the set of players and the strategy space is the same under every vertical structure. To facilitate the comparison of di¤erent vertical structures, we introduce two regularity conditions. A situation shall describe a vertical structure and a non-terminal history of the multi-stage game, i.e. a history where at least one player still has to move. In order to avoid technical complications that could arise if some continuation games have no subgame-perfect equilibrium, we require: C1 In every situation there is a subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium.
Note that for some forms of downstream competition and sabotage technologies, a given situation can have multiple subgame-perfect continuation equilibria. To simplify comparison between vertical structures in those cases, we also make a regularity condition on equilibrium selection: C2 Assume two situations have an identical set of subgame-perfect continuation equilibria. Then in both situations the same subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium shall be selected from this identical set.
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This regularity condition avoids tedious comparison of sets of equilibria. Note that C2 is obviously not needed when, in every situation, there is a unique continuation equilibrium. The following remark summarizes the essential implications of the regularity conditions for the subgame-perfect equilibria in our model:
Remark Since downstream entrants'pro…ts do depend on h and x; but not directly on the vertical structure, our regularity condition implies that the equilibrium actions of downstream entrants are a function of h and x 1 only. Furthermore, as-9 Note that there is no conceptual problem in determining whether continuation equilibria under di¤erent vertical structures are identical or not, since equilibria are strategy pro…les and the strategy space is the same under every vertical structure.
suming the same sabotage strategy h is chosen under legal unbundling and vertical integration, then downstream …rms choose the same equilibrium actions x; since the incumbent maximizes joint pro…ts 0 + 1 under both vertical structures.
We are now ready to state our …rst basic result. Proposition 2 Under legal unbundling total output Q and upstream pro…ts 0 are (weakly) higher than under separation.
The intuition for Proposition 2 di¤ers from that of Proposition 1. Under both legal unbundling and separation, the upstream …rm F 0 wants to maximize total output Q; i.e. there is no sabotage e¤ect. In contrast to separation, under legal unbundling the downstream incumbent F 1 participates in the upstream pro…ts 0 and therefore has an interest to select a decision x 1 that expands total output Q.
We call this the downstream expansion e¤ect.
To gain further intuition for the downstream expansion e¤ect, we consider some speci…c examples of downstream competition. It is helpful to decompose the output expansion under legal unbundling into two parts: the change in the incumbent's own output q 1 and an induced output e¤ect that measures the aggregate change in downstream entrants'output.
Consider …rst the simple case that there are no entrants and F 1 is a downstream monopolist, i.e. there is no induced output e¤ect. Then the output expansion under legal unbundling is due to the intuition known from the double marginalization problem: Under legal unbundling F 1 considers only the true marginal costs c 0 instead of the higher access price a and therefore chooses a higher output than under separation.
In the presence of entrants, the incumbent additionally takes the induced output e¤ect into account. In Section 4, we discuss in detail an example where …rms compete in prices. Basically, the incumbent sets an aggressively low price in order to induce higher output by the downstream entrants who match the low price.
Even if the access price a converges to the marginal cost c 0 , the quantity under legal unbundling is still larger than under vertical separation since-although the double marginalization problem vanishes-the induced output e¤ect is still present.
If …rms compete in quantities, a quantity expansion by the incumbent typically induces an output reduction by the entrants. Since the incumbent moves …rst, he will always take the induced output e¤ect into account and we will thus never …nd that F 1 takes an action such that total output is lower under legal unbundling than under separation. This means the downstream expansion e¤ect will never be negative when F 1 moves …rst.
Additional results
Legal unbundling vs separation under simultaneous moves If the incumbent and entrants move simultaneously, F 1 still prefers higher total output under legal unbundling than under separation. We cannot, however, in general exclude that the incumbent's desire to have higher total output may paradoxically lead to lower total output in equilibrium. Thus, the result of Proposition 2 will typically hold only under additional assumptions when downstream …rms move simultaneously. An example for this is to consider Cournot competition downstream and to assume a speci…c sabotage technology: Assume that sabotage linearly increases costs, i.e. h = fh 1 ; :::; h n g 2 R n such that the costs of …rm i become
is just some arbitrary function of q i : With this assumption, we retain our result of larger quantities under legal unbundling also for the case of simultaneous quantity competition:
Proposition 3 Consider the special case of the linear sabotage technology. Assume downstream …rms compete by simultaneously setting quantities (goods can be di¤erentiated). Then total output is (weakly) higher under legal unbundling than under both separation and vertical integration.
Under Cournot competition the incumbent does not directly take the induced output e¤ect into account, i.e. its best reply function takes competitors'output as given. The downstream expansion e¤ect is therefore driven by the double marginalization problem: Under legal unbundling, the incumbent calculates with true marginal costs c 0 instead of the higher access price a. Typically, a reduction in one …rm's marginal costs will lead to a higher total output in the Cournot equilibrium (see, for example, Farell and Shapiro (1990) for weak regularity conditions for the case of homogeneous goods). The reason that Proposition 3 also holds for cases where total output is increasing in a …rm's marginal cost, is that the upstream …rm can then prevent output reduction by increasing the incumbent's marginal costs via the linear sabotage technology.
Let us …nally discuss simultaneous price competition with di¤erentiated products in the downstream market. Under price competition, the incumbent wants to set lower prices under legal unbundling than under separation, because lower prices increase output. As long as prices are strategic complements, i.e. entrants react to a lower price of the incumbent by lowering their own prices, and total output is weakly decreasing in each …rm's price, we …nd that under legal unbundling no …rm sets higher prices and total output is weakly higher than under separation.
Implications of the output results Our output results suggest that from the consumers'perspective, legal unbundling is likely to be superior to the other two vertical structures. In particular, if the downstream products are homogenous (like, e.g., voice calls, electricity, or gas) and if downstream …rms charge linear tari¤s, it is immediate that higher quantities yield also a higher consumer surplus.
Corollary 1 If output goods are perfect substitutes and downstream …rms use linear tari¤s, consumer surplus is weakly highest under legal unbundling:
Legal unbundling can also be preferred by taxpayers, since F 0 makes higher pro…ts than under the other vertical structures: if the regulatory regime requires an ex ante subsidy that ensures that F 0 will break even, then such a subsidy would be lowest under legal unbundling.
Corollary 2 The minimal state subsidy, which guarantees that F 0 makes no losses, is lowest under legal unbundling.
Total welfare Without assumptions on how discrimination works and how downstream competition works, results on total welfare are not possible. Clearly there are cases where legal unbundling leads to higher output but to lower welfare, for example if there are sunk costs and legal unbundling facilitates excess entry (see the seminal paper by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) ). Nevertheless there will be many cases where total welfare is also highest under legal unbundling. One such case -a homogeneous goods duopoly with price competition -is exempli…ed in Section 4.
Comparison under optimal access prices Assume consumer surplus (and / or total welfare) is increasing in total output and regulators consider an access price to be optimal if it maximizes total output under the restriction that the upstream …rm can recover its …xed costs. In general, the optimal access price can depend on the vertical structure, and one may be interested to compare the total output, under the condition that under each vertical structure the optimal access price is selected. Our results imply that legal unbundling leads to (weakly) higher total output than separation and vertical integration also for the case that such optimal access prices are chosen in every vertical structure. Recall that we have
shown that for every access price a > c 0 legal unbundling leads to (weakly) higher output than the other vertical structures. Thus even for the access prices that yield the highest output under separation or vertical integration, legal unbundling will lead to (weakly) higher output and (weakly) higher upstream pro…ts. The output di¤erence will even increase if for legal unbundling one would also choose the optimal access price.
Reverse legal unbundling In order to make our results comparable to Cremer, Crémer, and De Donder (2006) , what is left to discuss is the case of "reverse unbundling". Recall that reverse legal unbundling means F 0 maximizes 0 + 1 , whereas F 1 has an independent management and maximizes 1 : In practice, this would imply that e.g. a integrated electricity company would have to form a legally independent sales unit which is owned by the network operations (or by the whole group, including generation facilities). The important point is that with reverse legal unbundling the essential facility would not be separated into an independent unit. We …nd that reverse unbundling leads to lower quantities in equilibrium compared to vertical separation and, by Proposition 1, also to lower quantities than legal unbundling. Vertically integrated network operators have no incentive for developing the network in the overall interests of the market and hence for facilitating new entry at generation or supply levels; on the contrary, they have an inherent interest to limit new investment when this will bene…t its competitors and bring new competition onto the incumbent's "home market". Instead, the investment decisions made by vertically integrated companies tend to be biased to the needs of supply a¢ liates. Such companies seem particularly disinclined to increase interconnection or gas import capacity and thereby boosting competition in the incumbent's home market to the detriment of the internal market.
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The Commission also makes clear that in its opinion only ownership unbundling, i.e. complete separation, can e¤ectively solve this problem:
Economic evidence shows that ownership unbundling is the most e¤ective means to ensure choice for energy users and encourage invest- ment. This is because separate network companies are not in ‡uenced by overlapping supply/generation interests as regards investment decisions.
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As we have shown in our basic model, not all overlapping interests are problematic. Under legal unbundling, the downstream expansion e¤ect as one sort of an overlapping interest, is rather bene…cial. Therefore, a more careful analysis of the investment incentives may turn out to be useful.
For the theoretical analysis it is helpful to split F 0 's investment decisions into two steps. One step is to decide on the allocation of investment if the total amount that shall be invested is given. The other step is to decide which total amount shall be invested.
Investment allocation with given budget
We …rst analyze F 0 's allocation decision, assuming that the total amount of investment spending is given. We simply take our basic model and interpret F 0 's strategic variable h not only as a sabotage strategy, but also as a decision about the investment allocation, which in ‡uences downstream …rms'costs and output. This interpretation is completely consistent with our model where downstream …rms'output, prices and costs are given by some general functions q i (x; h); p i (x; h) and C i (x; hja). It is also ful…lled that the allocation of investment has no in ‡uence on F 0 's costs, because the total amount invested is assumed to be given in this step.
Thus, our output results also apply, i.e., for a given sum of investment, F 0 will under legal unbundling always choose that allocation of investment that maximizes total output.
Endogenous investment budget Examining the second step, we cannot rule out, however, that the total amount of investment is lower under legal unbundling than under the alternative vertical structures. There even exist cases, where the resulting quantities can be lower under legal unbundling.
We …rst illustrate why investments I s and resulting total output Q s under separation may exceed the investments I u and total output Q u under legal unbundling in some circumstances. Assume that (i) the incumbent is more e¢ cient than the entrants, such that absent an investment, no entrants would be active and (ii) an investment would yield a level playing …eld for entrants and the incumbent. Under separation and without investment, the double marginalization problem would lead to a quantity lower than under legal unbundling. Thus, investing would yield a large increase in downstream quantities if, due to the investment, we moved from, say, a downstream monopoly to a Bertrand duopoly with identical costs. This increases upstream pro…ts signi…cantly and implies that the investment would be undertaken even if it is relatively costly. With legal unbundling, however, the network unit F 0 might …nd it optimal not to invest, since it can anticipate that in the quantity decision of the incumbent F 1 , the double marginalization problem is internalized and the quantity is relatively large already without an investment.
That investments under vertical integration, I v ; can be higher than under legal unbundling, I u < I v ; is less surprising and applies already in quite intuitive examples. Consider an investment that bene…ts only the incumbent F 1 ; who might then be able to drive competitors out of the market. This might reduce overall quantity, such that with legal unbundling the network unit F 0 would abstain from such an investment. While, in this case, investments are lower under legal unbundling, quantities will (typically) be higher under legal unbundling. However, it is not possible to generally rule out that legal unbundling with discriminatory investments can yield lower quantities than vertical integration.
Although total output may be lower under legal unbundling when the investment budget is endogenous, we can establish the following results:
Proposition 5 With capacity investments F 0 's pro…ts from network operations 0 minus investment costs are weakly higher under legal unbundling than under both separation and vertical integration. Total output ful…lls the following inequalities:
Concerns for the incumbent's downstream pro…ts play no role in those cases where investment levels are lower under legal unbundling. If investments and total output are lower under legal unbundling this is because higher investment is not worthwhile for the network operator itself.
The inequalities of Proposition 5 show that the output di¤erences Q One can, therefore, conjecture that such "expensive" expansions of downstream quantities are not welfare-enhancing. However, a comprehensive welfare analysis is not possible in our general framework.
The inequality also shows that possible under-investment may be reduced by increasing the access price a: This might be done in ways that do not distort down-stream …rms'demand when using the more general regulatory schemes illustrated in Section 5.
Investments in reducing upstream marginal costs
We now consider process innovations, i.e., investments of F 0 which reduce its marginal costs c 0 by some amount : Investment costs I( ) are strictly increasing in the level of marginal costs reduction : We …rst establish the following helpful lemma, which just proves the intuitive idea that for a lower level of upstream marginal costs total output will be weakly higher.
Lemma 1 Total output under legal unbundling is weakly decreasing in F 0 's marginal cost c 0 :
Provided with this intuitive result, we can show that investments and resulting output are highest with legal unbundling.
Proposition 6 Investment into marginal cost reduction and total output under legal unbundling are weakly higher than under vertical separation and vertical integration.
This investment result is, of course, mainly driven by the output results of Propositions 1 and 2. When a higher quantity is sold under legal unbundling there are obviously higher gains from cost reduction. Although intuitive, Proposition 6 is not completely trivial, since investments change the output and the extent to which marginal cost reduction increases output can be larger under vertical integration than under legal unbundling. Proposition 6 shows that investments are nevertheless always weakly higher under legal unbundling.
Investments into network safety and reliability
An important issue for energy and railway networks is safety and reliability. If the network breaks down, severe costs may be in ‡icted upon the network operator itself, on downstream …rms, as well as on …nal consumers and other on members of society.
Appropriate investments into network reliability are therefore an important issue. Integrated electricity companies sometimes claim that vertical integration is essential to guarantee reliable network operations. One may argue that reliability investments could, indeed, be larger under vertical integration, since not only losses of the network operator but also losses of the own downstream operations are taken into account. However, as long as the losses for the rest of society are not considered, reliability investments will be too low under all vertical structures, including vertical integration.
Su¢ cient levels of reliability investments therefore require contractual solutions that can impose …nes in case of network break-downs or -in cases where contractual solutions are not feasible -…nes imposed by the regulator or direct regulation.
We do not see a compelling reason why such contractual and regulatory arrangements should be more di¢ cult to achieve under legal unbundling than under the other vertical structures.
Sometimes, however, there may be problems to identify who was responsible for some network failure. Was it a mistake on the part of the upstream …rm or on the part of the downstream …rm that led to the break-down? In those cases there may be welfare losses due to costly litigation. When F 0 and F 1 are vertically integrated there may be some advantage, because for outsiders it is not important whether the upstream or downstream operations of the integrated …rm were responsible for some failure. But also under legal unbundling there should be less costly litigation between F 0 and F 1 , since F 1 receives all pro…ts from F 0 and has therefore no interests in a costly law suit.
Example: Duopolistic Price Competition
In the following, we illustrate the output result for a downstream duopoly that sells a homogeneous product, like electricity, and competes in prices (with F 1 moving …rst). This example provides two additional insights. First, it allows for a full welfare analysis, showing that indeed legal unbundling yields the highest level of social surplus. Second, it illustrates that the downstream expansion e¤ect is not exclusively driven by the double marginalization problem. We will make precise that the downstream expansion e¤ect is "signi…cant" even when the double marginalization problem becomes arbitrarily small.
Assumptions There are two downstream …rms selling perfect substitutes. Total demand is given by a downward sloping demand function Q(p); Q 0 (p) < 0:
We maintain the assumption that the incumbent F 1 moves …rst. We assume constant marginal cost of the downstream …rms, with a cost disadvantage for the incumbent. Sabotage linearly increases downstream costs. Thus, cost functions are given by
with c 1 > c 2 : Considering a cost disadvantage for the incumbent is of interest since a standard argument for liberalizing markets is to allow more e¢ cient …rms to enter the downstream market.
To avoid uninteresting case distinctions, we make some regularity conditions. First, we assume that for some prices above the incumbent's marginal cost plus access price a + c 1 there is still positive demand, i.e. a separated incumbent could make positive pro…ts if it were a downstream monopolist. Second, we assume that if F 2 were a monopolist on the downstream market, its optimal monopoly price lies above a + c 1 : Third, we assume that the access price a is not so high that it is Pareto-dominated by some lower access price. This means it is not the case that all …rms and consumers would be weakly better o¤ (and at least one of them strictly better o¤) by some lower access price.
As is well known, in this set-up multiple equilibria can arise. We only consider equilibria in which …rms do not play weakly dominated strategies.
Finally, for the question of how the market is split between the two …rms in case they choose identical prices, we make the following tie-breaking assumptions.
If the price is above F 2 's marginal costs, i.e. p > c 2 +a, we assume that F 2 gets the whole market (for the out-of-equilibrium event that p 1 = p 2 < c 2 + a, we assume F 1 gets the whole market). This captures the idea that if prices were discrete on a su¢ ciently …ne grid then F 2 as second mover would prefer minimally to undercut the price if p > c 2 + a and prefer not to sell any output if p < c 2 + a:
If the price is equal to F 2 's marginal cost, i.e. p = c 2 + a; then F 1 can decide whether F 1 gets the whole market, F 2 gets the whole market, or the market is split equally, i.e. q 1 = q 2 = 1 2 Q: This captures the idea that if prices were discrete, F 1 could either set a price slightly above F 2 's marginal cost, in which case F 2 gets the whole market, exactly split the market at F 2 's marginal cost, or slightly undercut F 2 's marginal cost to get the whole market.
Vertical separation This is the typical Bertrand case, except for the fact that F 1 moves …rst. We …nd the following result:
Lemma 2 Under separation in every equilibrium F 2 gets the whole market. The in…mum of the market prices from all equilibria where no …rm plays a weakly dominated strategy is given p = a + c 1 :
The price p = a + c 1 ; which equals the high cost …rm's marginal cost, is the typical Bertrand outcome. Nevertheless there are additional equilibria. As under simultaneous moves, there are equilibria with prices between a + c 2 and a + c 1 ;
but those are equilibria where F 1 plays a weakly dominated strategy. If there is only a small doubt that F 2 will not undercut F 1 , then F 1 will never set a price below its own marginal cost a + c 1 . Since F 1 moves …rst and always makes zero pro…ts, there are also equilibria with prices above a + c 1 ; i.e. a price of a + c 1 is not the only outcome but the welfare optimal outcome when we neglect weakly dominated strategies.
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Legal unbundling Under legal unbundling F 0 again wants to maximize total output and therefore will not sabotage. Contrary to vertical separation, now the downstream incumbent F 1 has an incentive to increase total output, since F 0 's pro…ts will accrue to F 1 under legal unbundling. Therefore F 1 will price more aggressively in order to increase output and thereby upstream pro…ts su¢ ciently.
This form of aggressive pricing is taken to the extreme in our case of price competition with homogeneous goods, because here F 1 prices more aggressively without even having some positive market share:
Lemma 3 Under legal unbundling F 0 sets h 2 = 0. F 1 and F 2 both set prices c 2 +a and F 2 gets the whole market.
Note that even though the price set by F 1 , p 1 = a + c 2 ; can be below F 1 's true marginal costs c 0 + c 1 , it is not a weakly dominated strategy for F 1 to set such a price -in contrast to what we found under vertical separation. This is because if F 1 would set a higher price, F 2 would react with a higher price and total output, and therefore the pro…t of the integrated …rm 0 + 1 would be reduced.
Vertical integration With vertical integration, there are two candidates for an equilibrium. Either the upstream …rm uses sabotage in order to drive F 2 out of the market (the "monopolistic"outcome), or F 0 does not sabotage F 2 and then F 1 acts in the same way as under legal unbundling (the "competitive"outcome).
Lemma 4 If F 0 and F 1 are integrated. There are two candidates for equilibrium:
(m) monopoly case: Set h 2 = 1 and let F 1 serve the whole market at the monopoly price of the integrated …rm, denoted by p m 01 .
12 To be precise, in the equilibrium with a price of exactly a + c 1 , F 1 also plays a weakly dominated strategy since for no action of F 2 will F 1 make positive pro…ts. But there is a sequence of equilibrium prices that converges from above to a + c 1 , where in no such equilibrium a …rm plays a weakly dominated strategy.
(u) competitive case: The same as under legal unbundling. Set h 2 = 0 and p 1 = p 2 = c 2 + a and let F 2 get the whole market.
In the monopoly case pro…ts of the integrated …rm are given by Reverse legal unbundling The following lemma shows that under reverse legal unbundling we either have the same market price as under separation or the monopoly price of an integrated …rm. In fact, the worse of these two outcomes is realized, i.e. reverse legal unbundling is weakly worse than both separation and vertical integration.
Lemma 5 Under reverse legal unbundling the market price will be p = maxfp m 01 ; a+ c 1 g. At price a + c 1 …rms F 1 or F 2 may produce, but at price p m 01 ; F 1 will serve the whole market.
The intuition is that under reverse legal unbundling, F 0 maximizes joint pro…ts and therefore has incentives for sabotage, and at the same time F 1 only maximizes its own pro…ts and therefore has no incentives to lower prices in order to increase output.
Comparison of the four cases Equipped with the solutions for the four cases we see that in this example legal unbundling is strictly superior to all other vertical structures (except for the competitive case of vertical integration, which yields an outcome identical to legal unbundling). Total output and consumer surplus are inversely related to the market price and therefore highest under legal unbundling.
Pro…ts of F 0 are increasing in total output and hence also highest under legal unbundling. Production is e¢ cient since F 2 produces everything. Total welfare is increasing in total output as long as market prices are weakly above marginal cost of production c 0 + c 2 ; which is always the case. Thus we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Under legal unbundling, prices are strictly lower, and total output, pro…t of F 0 , consumer surplus and total welfare are strictly higher than under separation, reverse legal unbundling and the monopoly case of vertical integration.
(In the competitive case of vertical integration, we have identical outcomes to legal unbundling).
Proof. Immediate from comparing the outcomes of the four cases. (L2) F 0 's pro…ts 0 are strictly increasing in total output Q. 13 We also have extended the price competition example for allowing investments into marginal cost reduction. Legal unbundling then always yields the welfare-optimal level of investments. A proof is available from the authors upon request.
It turns out that our main results hold for every price regulation scheme that ful…lls conditions (L1) and (L2). Let denote a price regulation scheme that ful…lls (L1) and (L2). It determines how much money F 0 receives when selling a total output Q; which we denote by a revenue function R(Qj ): Furthermore the scheme speci…es how much downstream …rms have to pay when actions x are chosen (which imply quantities q i ). Thus pro…ts are given by
hj ) for i = 1; :::; n To ensure that (L2) is ful…lled, we require that for all Q 0 ; Q with Q 0 > Q it
For these more general regulatory schemes, which provide scope for additional desirable features, all the results proven in Section 3 and 4 still hold.
Proposition 9
The following results hold for every regulatory pricing scheme that ful…lls (L1) and (L2): Proposition 1, 2, 4, 5 (…rst sentence) and 6.
Our proofs for the mentioned propositions in the appendix all use the more general class of regulatory schemes illustrated in this section. Thus, we …nd that also for the larger class of regulatory schemes, legal unbundling can be seen as a golden mean between separation and vertical integration as it still delivers higher quantities and good investment incentives.
Example Consider the following example for such a pricing scheme: The regulator pays the upstream …rm a linear access price a > c 0 ; but charges the downstream …rms a two-part tari¤ with an access price equal to c 0 plus a …xed fee. It is not necessary that the regulators'revenues have to equal expenditures, i.e. the higher marginal price paid to F 0 may also be (partly) …nanced by subsidies. 14 This scheme has two bene…ts: First, a high access price a provides F 0 strong incentives to maximize total output, which may be a good way to induce a su¢ cient high budget for capacity investments (see Section 3.1). Second, output in downstream markets is increased because, for the downstream …rms, access is priced at its true marginal costs c 0 .
Although under this regulatory scheme there is no double marginalization problem, output under legal unbundling may still be strictly above the output under 14 Imposing high …xed fees can be problematic, because they may foreclose market entry by small downstream …rms. In such cases subsidies may be preferred.
separation. For an illustration consider the price competition example from the previous section. If we assume that F 0 's markup a c 0 is …nanced by a subsidy (rather than a …xed fee), the analysis under this regulatory scheme is very similar to the original analysis and the results are straightforward: Under legal unbundling the entrant serves the whole market at the welfare-optimal price of c 0 + c 2 , while under separation the entrant serves the market at a higher price of c 0 + c 1 .
Inappropriateness of legal unbundling in the absence of access regulation
It is important to note that legal unbundling can yield very bad outcomes if access prices are unregulated. If F 0 could freely decide on access prices, the strategy that maximizes upstream pro…ts 0 would be to charge the incumbent F 1 a very high access price and at the same time use all available measures to maximize 
Discussion
The analysis so far has shown that under rather general assumptions, legal unbundling exhibits desirable properties. Nevertheless, regulatory authorities often evaluate legal unbundling negatively. For instance, Neelie Kroes, European Competition Commissioner, expressed her views as follows:
Speaking very personally, I see only one way forward if we are to restore credibility and faith in the market. Europe has had enough of "Chinese walls" and quasiindependence. There has to be a structural solution that once and for all separates infrastructure from supply and generation. In other words: ownership unbundling.
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A key concern in the European policy debate on vertical industry structures are investment incentives, in particular, for investments in cross-border transmission capacities. Such investments could pave the way for an integrated European market for electricity with an increased level of competition. Also for this issue, the EU Commission prefers vertical separation over legal unbundling. In the words of Commissioner Kroes:
As you will know, where interconnector capacity is scarce, it is auctioned o¤ to the highest bidder, generating congestion revenues.
If you look at our report, you will …nd that from 2001 to 2005, three
German TSOs generated congestion revenues of over 400 million Euros.
Of these revenues, under 30 million Euros were used to build new interconnectors-that's less than 10%!
In contrast, our experience shows that fully unbundled operators see clearer incentives for investment in interconnectivity, and act on those incentives, because they are focused on optimizing the use of the network.
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Although the European Commission views vertical separation (or ownership unbundling) as the most preferred vertical industry structure, it has positively considered an alternative structure with an "independent systems operator":
[...] the Commission has also examined an alternative approach known as 'ISO'or Independent System Operator, whereby the vertically integrated company maintains ownership of the network assets and receives a regulated return on them, but is not responsible for their operation, maintenance or development. We believe that our analysis helps to understand better the e¤ects from measures mentioned in the three quotes. We discuss the three points in turn.
First, our theoretical analysis assumed that legal unbundling works perfectly in separating the interests of the network company from the rest of the integrated group. This seems often not to be the case. Thus, it is important to understand what happens if the network company acts not completely independently and also takes into account the pro…ts of the downstream …rm F 1 : This is analyzed in detail in Hö-er and Kranz (2007) . There it is shown that reducing the independence of the network …rm yields the expected result of lowering total output. Put di¤er-ently: more independence, i.e. a stronger regulation, increases the output. The optimum ownership structure therefore can depend on the strength of regulation.
Hö-er and Kranz (2007) show that if regulation is weak, vertical separation can indeed yield higher quantities than legal unbundling. However, if regulation is su¢ ciently strong, the results of the current paper apply (i.e. highest quantities under legal unbundling).
Since the e¤ect of legal unbundling therefore seems to depend on the strength of regulation, the negative experiences of regulators may well be explained by insuf…ciently strong regulation. Although "su¢ ciently strong" regulation might not be implementable as such, 18 it might also be the case that intensifying regulation is possible and that such a strengthening of regulation will lead to a situation where legal unbundling is the preferred vertical structure. This could be done either by The resulting policy implication, therefore, is to strengthen regulation and to thoroughly implement the existing regulations in order to increase the independence before changing the regime towards full separation. Additionally, requiring legally unbundled …rms to take on a minority outside investor, could help to increase independence. Consider a minority stake of, say 10%, of an institutional investor in the network company. The interest of the downstream …rm in the network pro…ts would still be large, such that bene…cial e¤ects of legal unbundling are still signi…cant; at the same time, the investor has an interest in enforcing that the network company maximizes only its own pro…ts.
The issue of investments, addressed in the second quote, is also interesting in light of our …ndings. From a theoretical perspective, completely separated network operators will also have incentives to provide only a monopoly amount of interconnector capacity -below the socially optimal level -if they directly receive the congestion revenues from the interconnector auctions. 21 Theory can also predict that legal unbundling can exaggerate this problem, since under legal unbundling the downstream incumbent may bid higher prices in the capacity auction in order to increase congestion revenues and thereby the pro…ts of the network operator.
In this context, our discussion of more general regulatory schemes proves useful.
One suggestion is to modify the capacity auction as follows: The regulator receives the revenues from the capacity auction and pays the network operator a regulated …xed access price for every unit that is sold in the auction. Then the network operator cannot in ‡uence the price it receives and therefore has no incentives to act like a capacity-reducing monopolist. Such a regime satis…es the assumptions of section 5.1; thus, we expect that legal unbundling will yield a higher output than separation under this modi…ed regulation scheme.
Finally, consider the issue of independent system operators, subject to a rate of return regulation, mentioned in the third quote. The driving force for the bene…ts of legal unbundling over separation in our model is the fact that the downstream incumbent receives the network operator's pro…ts and therefore wants to increase total output. But if, as suggested, the downstream incumbent only receives a regulated return on its network assets (independent of the pro…ts from network required under the Second Gas Directive, this does not mean that TSOs necessarily comply with them." (Sector Inquiry, Part 1, para 153, p. 57). 21 See Hö-er and Wittmann (2007) for a discussion of "supply reduction" in interconnector auctions.
operations), it has no incentive to increase total output, and the bene…ts of legal unbundling compared to separation would not arise.
To conclude the discussion, let us remark that we have left out some important issues. For instance, we have not discussed "vertical economies", i.e. possible e¢ ciency gains from vertical integration from a technological or transaction cost point of view. The evidence for their existence is somewhat unclear, however. Fraquelli, Piacenza, and Vannoni (2005) , Kwoka (2002) , or Kaserman and Mayo (1991) , for example, …nd evidence for more or less economically signi…cant vertical economies. Although such economies of vertical integration may not be fully realized under legal unbundling, they should be realized to a larger extent than under complete separation. For example, the hold-up problem is likely to be reduced under legal unbundling, since F 1 would in an investment decision take into account the surplus accruing to F 0 and also has no interest in costly ex-post bargaining with F 0 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that, from a theoretical point, legal unbundling can be seen as a "golden mean" between complete separation and full vertical integration. If access prices are regulated and legal unbundling can ensure that the network company, controlling the essential facility, maximizes only the own pro…ts, legal unbundling ensures higher quantities than the other vertical structures. This result is important, since higher quantities typically imply that also consumer surplus will be higher under legal unbundling.
A key message of our analysis is that, in addition to the sabotage e¤ect, policy makers should also consider the downstream expansion e¤ect: Under legal unbundling -compared to separation -the incumbent's downstream operations not only internalize the double marginalization problem but additionally can induce an output expansion by competitors. Most pronounced, in the case of downstream price competition, the incumbent prices more aggressively compared to a vertically separated downstream company, since this leads to a price reduction and higher quantities of downstream competitors and thereby to higher pro…ts of the upstream operations.
We also analyzed investment incentives. Legal unbundling provides the better incentives for investments into the reduction of marginal costs and for the allocation of a given budget for capacity investments. Although, we cannot generally rule out cases where legal unbundling leads to lower budgets for capacity investments, our results suggest that even in those cases legal unbundling may often be welfare superior. Concerning investments into network reliability, we argued that contractual solutions or appropriate regulation are needed under all vertical structures to ensure su¢ cient levels of investment.
We demonstrated that our results not only apply for linear access prices, but also for more general regulatory regimes. In the absence of price regulation, legal unbundling loses its appealing properties, however.
Policy recommendations cannot ignore the negative experiences regulators have made so far with legal unbundling. Our contribution is to o¤er a fairly general economic analysis of legal unbundling which helps to see potential bene…ts and to identify the necessary prerequisites for these bene…ts to apply. Our tentative policy recommendation would therefore be: Regulators should …rst try to implement legal unbundling rigorously, with particular emphasis on the independent decision making in the unbundled network unit, considering also to oblige legally unbundled network operators to take on minority shareholders. Only if experiences after full implementation are still negative, a regime shift towards full vertical separation should be considered.
Appendix: Proofs
We prove Propositions 1, 3, 4 (…rst sentence), 5, 6 and Lemma 1 and 2 directly for the more general regulatory schemes introduced in section 5. The original propositions are a special case of this set-up, since a linear access price a > c 0 ful…lls conditions (L1) and (L2 
Adding both inequalities yields 0 (x u ; h s ) 0 (x s ; h s ) and since upstream pro…ts 0 are strictly increasing in total output, this implies that total output is weakly higher under legal unbundling than under separation, i.e. Q(
Proof of Proposition 3: (Cournot) F 0 can guarantee the same output under legal unbundling than under separation, an output of Q u = Q s , by setting h Proof of Proposition 4: If F 0 sets the same sabotage strategy under separation than under reverse legal unbundling, i.e. h s = h r the total output and 0 will be the same, since downstream …rms will act in the same way. Since under separation F 0 wants to maximize total output and 0 , it will at least achieve output and 0 at least as high as under reverse legal unbundling, which is guaranteed by setting
Proof of Proposition 5: If under legal unbundling the same total amount would be invested as under separation (vertical integration), we only have an investment allocation problem, which is equivalent to our basic model as explained in the text.
Thus, Proposition 1 applies and we know that 0 must be weakly higher under legal unbundling. Under legal unbundling F 0 wants to maximize total output Q: We show that F 0
Adding up the two inequalities yields (c a 0 We will now show that Proof of Lemma 3: At price c 2 + a the incumbent F 1 prefers to give the whole market to F 2 , since 1 is strictly negative for all prices below c 1 + a. F 0 can guarantee this outcome by not sabotaging F 2 , and therefore no equilibrium with a higher price than c 2 + a can exist. If a is large there could be cases, however, with an equilibrium price p 0 strictly between c 0 + c 1 and c 2 + a where F 1 gets the whole market. Although 1 would then be negative, joint pro…ts 1 + 0 could be higher than under the outcome where F 2 gets the whole market at price c 2 + a, because output Q and upstream pro…ts 0 are higher. Such an equilibrium with a price p 0 < c 2 + a can only arise, however, if the access price is Pareto-dominated by a lower access price. To see this, consider an access price a 0 < a that ful…lls a 0 + c 2 = p 0 : With such an access price, F 1 would prefer to give the whole market to F 2 at price p 0 instead of taking the market itself (since 1 is negative under p 0 ).
Access price a 0 Pareto-dominates access price a; because no …rm nor consumers are worse o¤ and F 1 is strictly better o¤ under this outcome with access price a 0 :
Proof of Lemma 4: If F 1 gets the market, then the optimal price is F 1 's monopoly price under costs c 1 + c 0 : If F 2 gets the total market it is optimal that this happens at the lowest possible price that F 2 is ever willing to pay, i.e. c 2 + a: Joint pro…t 01 can also not be higher in a situation where both …rms split total output at some price p: Since goods are perfect substitutes and marginal costs linear, 01 from splitting the market is at least as high if either only F 1 or only F 2 gets the total market at the same price p.
Proof of Lemma 5: Since under reverse legal unbundling F 1 maximizes its own pro…ts 1 and by assumption plays no weakly dominated strategy, F 1 will never set a price below a + c 1 ; which implies that no equilibrium with a price below a + c 1 exists. Since F 0 maximizes joint pro…ts 0 + 1 and 1 is non-negative for all prices p a + c 1 ; F 0 weakly prefers that F 1 serves the whole market. Joint pro…t 01 is then maximized by the monopoly price would be p Proof of Proposition 9: We prove the …rst sentence of the proposition for the case of legal unbundling; for vertical separation, the steps are similar. Total welfare, excluding investment costs, under legal unbundling is in our Bertrand model given by
where the market price p u = a + c 2 does not depend on c 0 and : We thus …nd 
